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Annex "A," Subparagraph 1k,
Sociological Background

RELIGION

I. INTRODUCTION

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178 Religious organization and activity in China has always been strictly limited by what the state felt to be desirable. Public and private morality were not based on any religion but on a combination of philosophic principles (Confucianism) and secular mores. (On this principle, Confucianism is treated in the chapters on Social Values and Patterns of Living.) Governmental authority judged whether a certain religion was conducive to morality and the welfare of the state and then allowed the religion and its adherents a carefully defined range and sphere of activity. Anything beyond that range was regarded as subversive of public welfare and morality, and the religion was curbed or suppressed. As a consequence China has not had, until very recently, any "churches," that is well-organized, centrally disciplined organizations of believers capable of decisively influencing public morality or state policy.

With the slow collapse of the traditional order the effectiveness of government control of religion diminished. The Western powers, as they gained more and more rights and concessions from a weakening China, demanded and

•771/178 got "rights" of religious and missionary activity which no strong Chinese government would ever have granted. But the rise of nationalist sentiment brought with it hatred of foreigners and of their religions -- hatred that exploded repeatedly in anti-foreign, anti-Christian riots.[1]

Meanwhile another trend was visible. Religious groups and a number of outstanding political leaders began to feel that China could not become truly modern and Western unless it was reformed from the moral base upward; religion accounted for the power and success of Western nations. Would not a religion -- a religionized Confucianism, a revitalized Buddhism, or even Christianity -- bring about that basic transformation that China clearly needed?

This view was rejected by two overlapping groups which had decisive power in state and society after 1925. The first were the intellectual leaders, increasingly committed to some form of materialistic philosophy -- a philosophy which held all religion to be parasitic, corrosive and "non-progressive."[2] The second group was the Kuomintang elite, many of whom derived their anti-religious views from the intellectual leadership. For others in the Kuomintang elite the

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1. Tatsuro and Sumiko Yamamoto, "The Anti-Christian Movement in China," Far Eastern Quarterly, Feb. 1953, pp. 133-47.

2. O. Brière, "Les courants philosophiques en Chine depuis 50 ans," Bulletin de l'université de l'Aurore, No. 40, 1947, pp. 561-654.

771/178 older Confucian view of religions, reinforced by nationalist feeling, reasserted itself; consciously or unconsciously they reverted to the view that no strong self-respecting government should tolerate independent religious bodies that challenged the government's right to control all aspects of public and private life.

Religions in the twentieth century were caught in this crossfire of negative sentiment and attack. To modernize and to become militant was to provoke state suppression, and the effort of religious leaders to stem the rising tide of intellectual materialism failed.[3] In the countryside the old folk religions -- varieties of Buddhism and Taoism -- continued to wither away. Christianity made some advances, but it was always tainted by its foreignness, by the fact that its missionaries came with the backing of Western powers which held China in thrall.

771/798 Communist policy towards religion is in many ways the culmination of the trends we have described. It reflects the trimph of materialist philosophy and the imposition of materialism as the intellectual orthodoxy. It is highly nationalistic and anti-foreign and thus insists that all religious organizations cease receiving support from abroad and assert their distinctive Chinese character. It carries forward, through the most effective apparatus of control and coercion that China has seen, the confiscation of church propert

3. O. Brière, op. cit., passim.

771 798 and the secularization of the clergy. The Communist Constitution provides that "Citizens of the People's Republic of China have freedom of religious belief."[4] This means, in practice, that people of various religious persuasions are allowed a limited and shrinking area of belief and action by an authoritarian government which reserves the fundamental right to control all education, communication, and public and private morality. On the grounds of anti-superstition, anti-imperialism, and anti-feudalism, the government and Party move steadily, with only occasional tactical retreats, towards the liquidation of religion in China.

Both pre-Communist trends and Communist policies should be kept in mind as we consider religion in the North China Region.

II. BUDDHISM

779 798 This oldest of imported religions shows, in its recent development, some of the trends just noted. Despite the efforts of the noted abbot T'ai Hsü (1889-1946), Buddhism never competed successfully for the allegiance of the intellectuals. The effort to transform it into a modern religion, by updating both its doctrine and its social program, failed, although for a time it seemed to show signs of an increasing vitality. Under warlord and nationalist governments its personnel and establishments suffered servere attrition.

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4. Article 88, Ch. III.

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III. TAOISM

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• 771 Some of the tendencies noted in the modern history of Chinese Buddhism are also to be found in Taoism. But the differences are many, and they spring from fundamental differences between the two religions.

It is convenient for our purposes to consider two levels of Taoism. One is Taoism as an organized religion; the other is Taoism as a folk religion at the village level.[25] The Taoist religion developed as a reaction to the challenge of the imported faith of Buddhism. It borrowed extensively from its alien rival; its scripture, its clerical hierarchy and organization, its rituals, its heavens and hells were often scarcely disguised copies of those of Buddhism. Its decline over the last five-hundred years has been slow but steady; in recent years its decline has accelerated. Some aspects of this should be noted. Intellectual vitality has long since disappeared, and there was little doctrine on which to base a modern revival of the religion. The priesthood, divided between northern and southern sects, was largely locally recruited; there was no central control exercised by the hereditary "Heavenly Teachers" (T'ien-shih) of the two sects, and the monks gained the reputation

25. The residue of philosophic Taoism is dealt with in the chapter on Basic Attitudes in this handbook.

771 779 of being idle and corrupt. If their way of life was hardly inspiring, their practical function no longer involved spiritual leadership but only astrological and magical performances for those of the population who might still believe in them.[26] The last "Heavenly Teacher" of the Southern School was driven from his headquarters in Kiangsi by the Communists in 1927; in 1949 he was again a refugee in Macao and had "decided that it was time for him to buy some books to read."[27] The last abbot of the headquarters of the Northern School, the Po-yün-kuan at Peking, was burned alive by his fellow monks in 1947 when his corruption became too flagrant. The Nationalist Government then confiscated the lands which had long supported the Po-yün-kuan.

779 771 668 Religious Taoism has not had the inspiration or the leadership to develop modern doctrines and programs as Buddhism and Islam have done. There was an abortive effort at a national Taoist association in the years 1912-15,[28] but this was not accompanied by any rallying of believers, nor was it followed by the development of any social, educational, or medical program. Taoist temples have been steadily secularized, and the Communists will complete this process. The Communists themselves recognize that "religious

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26. Chan, op. cit., pp. 146-52.

27. Ibid., p. 152.

28. Shina mondai jiten, [Encyclopedia of China Problems], Tokyo, 1942, pp. 416-17.

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779 Taoism" is dead. In 1949, when bidding for the
771 support of religious groups, they invited repre-
668 sentatives of Buddhism, Protestantism, and Islam to the People's Political Consultative Conference but no representative of Taoism.[29]

779 Folk Taoism in the present study includes
771 all of the local cults and practices that have, for millenia, been characteristic of the villages of China. Organized Taoism in many respects simply magnified and encompassed a wide variety of folk cults, giving this amalgam some of the trappings of an organized "religion." Folk Taoism, like organized Taoism, has been in a long slow decline. The gods of its pantheon have been increasingly neglected; the shrines and temples in the towns and villages have fallen into neglect. The arrival of modern school teachers, the appearance, even occasional, of effective modern doctors has steadily undermined belief in the efficacy of magic, alchemy, and charms. The City God, tutelary deity of an urban center, is no longer enshrined and worshiped; in many villages the god of grain no longer [illegible].[30] One sample survey[31] showed that in the early 1930's, 58 per cent of the folk shrines were no longer being used for

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29. Chan, op. cit., p. 146.

30. Cf. Chan, op. cit., p. 145, for an excellent summary of their development.

31. C.S. Braden, Modern Tendencies in World Religions, New York, 1933, p. 113, as cited in Chan, op. cit., p. 145.

779 their original purpose; the decline in the last
771 twenty-five years has been accelerated.

779 In the case of folk Taoism, the Communists
771 have moved to bring to an end a complex of an-
668 cient practices that had long been dying out. Their method has been a campaign against superstition, a campaign carried out with all of the many devices of propaganda and pressure which are described elsewhere in this volume. It may be sufficient here to point out a few typical methods of attack on folk religion. In a rhymed 32 indoctrination text for women we find exhortations to stay away from local witch doctors and, when ill, to consult a physician. And they are warned not to believe in prayer to the images of some divinity, "for these are only of mud and lacquer." At all levels of education and in the annual cycles of "campaigns," such as the Patriotic Health Drive, and the Resist-America-Aid-Korea Movement, reference is made to the false and debilitating character of the old beliefs, which are held to be "feudal," unscientific," "reactionary," etc. It is doubtful that the remnants of folk religion -- in recent years the resort only of the aged and the ignorant -- will long survive the campaigns being waged against them.

779 Another Taoist-linked institution is the
771 secret society. These organizations have
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32. Fu-nü San-tzu Ching [The Three-Character Classic for Women], Shanghai, Hsin-hua, 1950, passim.

779 traditionally drawn their rituals, liturgies,
575 doctrines, and patron deities from religious and
668 folk Taoism. They have had a variety of social
771 and political functions: they provide, expecially in times of disorder, a closely knit confraternity from which the member can draw help and security. They offer a focus of social and religious life particularly appealing to those who travel beyond the limits of their local kinship groups. Throughout the Ch'ing Dynasty (1644-1911), many secret societies had a strong political function as a focus of anti-dynastic and anti-official sentiment and activity; they made a notable contribution to the victory of the republicans in 1911. Yet Sun Yat-sen found them unmanageable political allies, and by 1930 Chiang Kai-shek -- despite whatever support he may have derived from them in his seizure of power in 1927 -- began to campaign against them.[33] This was interrupted by his campaigns against the Communists and his preparations to resist the Japanese.

The Communist regime obviously will not tolerate any such closed, self-supporting, potentially subversive groups, and a series of campaigns has been carried out against them. At the end of a major drive in 1953, P'eng Chen reported that "four million duped members had withdrawn from these reactionary sects and societies

33. Cf. B. Favre, Les sociétés secrètes en Chine, Paris, 1933, p. 177.

779 and that the battle was essentially won."[34] That
575 his claims of victory were premature is sug-
668 gested by a recent report of the dissolution of
771 five secret society organizations in the vicinity of Kalgan. The report accused the societies of elaborate clandestine organizations, hidden headquarters, an elaborate hierarchy of leadership, and efforts to infiltrate Communist organizations.[35] (The societies' power of resistance is discussed in the chapter on Subversive Potentialities.)

Secret societies have been particularly numerous in North China.

The Pai-lien Chiao (White Lotus Society) has a long history. It was founded some seven hundred years ago and was then a focus of Chinese resistance to the Mongol invaders. In 1794, 1801, and 1813 its members rebelled against the Manchu dynasty. The society's areas of strength in modern times have been the provinces of Honan, Shantung, and Hopei. It has many branches, some of which will be considered separately below.[36]

The Hung-ch'iang Hui (Society of Redspears) an offshoot of the White Lotus Society, fought bandits, government troops, and warlord armies between 1916 and 1924. It was strong in Shansi,

34. NCNA dispatch of Sept. 18, 1953, quoted in Walker, China Under Communism, p. 189.

35. NCNA, June 16, 1955; SCMP, 1078, June 28, 1955, pp. 27-28.

36. Chan, op. cit., p. 158.

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779 Hopei, Shantung, Honan, and Anhwei, but its
575 center of strength has since shifted to the south
668 and southwest.[37]
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The Tsai-li Hui (Principle Abiding Society) is often regarded as a branch of the White Lotus Society. Despite frequent persecution, it has remained strong, particularly in Hopei, Shantung, and Honan. Its public halls were to be found all over the north, especially in Tientsin and Peking. It attracted artisans and laborers, some farmers and merchants, and a small number of intellectuals.[38]

The Ko-lao Hui (Society of Elders) is somewhat more religious than other societies and has a history of resistance to government controls. Founded in Fukien, it has had important strength in Central and West China and in the North. It is "the most extensive, well-organized, and influential of China's secret societies."[39]

The I-kuan Tao (Way of Pervading Unity) was founded soon after the revolution of 1911, but it grew most rapidly after 1928. It gained strength and extended its activities throughout North China during the period of Japanese occupation.[40] Its central office was probably

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37. Ibid., p. 159.
38. Ibid., pp. 156-57.
39. Ibid., pp. 160,-61.
40. Ibid., pp. 166-67. Willem Grootaers, "Une société secrète moderne, I-koan Tao, bibliographie annotée," Folklore Studies, Vol. V, 1946, pp. 316-52.

779 in Shantung, but its center of publication was in
575 Tientsin. The society was under severe pressure
668 from the Nationalist Government, which seized
771 two of its local headquarters and dispersed its members.[41] Nevertheless, it has survived. A Communist release on June 16, 1955, indicated that the society is still a disciplined and resourceful organization, at least in the Kalgan region.[42]

IV. MOHAMMEDANISM

779 This religion was introduced into China, not by missionaries but by immigrants arriving overland from the west and northwest and by sea to Canton; they have since spread until there are some in every province, although the highest concentration is in the northwest and southwest. Since their ancestors were immigrants, the Mohammedans have been treated by Chinese governments as both an ethnic minority and a religious group. (Hence, see the chapter on Ethnic Minorities.) Adherents have tended to live in separate communities, their mores and customs governed by religious law rather than by the laws and customs of China. Not only did Islam prescribe for the believer a different way of life from that of the Chinese, it also had international connections and a tradition of militancy. These aspects of Modammedanism made their communities in China the object of government distrust, and governments in modern times have

41. Grootaers, op. cit., pp. 316, 351.
42. SCMP, 1078, June 28, 1955, pp. 27-28.

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CHAPTER XVIII

Religion

771 RELIGION in Ting Hsien finds its outward expression in the Buddhist, Taoist, and Official temples, in the Mohammedan mosques and Christian churches. Just when these various religions first came to Ting Hsien cannot now be determined. Some of the gods belong to China's earliest history, others have arisen or become prominent in the more recent past. Some are pure spirits, others are heroes and famous men of an earlier time who have been deified by the Emperor and given rank and title in the spirit world. It is said that Emperor Yao was the first one to offer sacrifices to Ch'eng Huang, the god of the city walls and moat. Yueh Fei, who lived from 1103 to 1141 in the later part of the Sung dynasty, is one of the gods of war, a god of filial piety and gives help to those seeking to settle disputes. Lao Tzu, the reputed founder of Taoism, is said by some to have been born in Honan in 604 B.C. Confucius, the most prominent of the worthies worshiped in the Official temples, lived from 551 to 479 B.C. Sakyamuni, the founder of Buddhism, was born in 624 B.C., but it was probably the first century A.D. before Buddhism was introduced into China. Mohammedans first settled in China early in the seventh century. A Nestorian monk arrived in 635 A.D. Giovanni Di Monte Corvino, the first Christian missionary who is known to have come to Peking, arrived in 1293. During the reign of K'ang Hsi, 1662–1722, Catholic converts came from Peking to at least one of the hsien near Ting Hsien. Protestant Christian missions first began work in Peking in 1861.

121 771 In our study of religion in Ting Hsien we have concerned ourselves primarily with its outward expression, the number of the temples, mosques, and churches, the temple fairs, and various religious organizations. The beliefs, ceremonies, and rituals of the various religions and cults were for the most part the same as those found in other parts of North China and have been studied and described by others.

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do something for his native village. When built, the temple was dedicated to the deity who offered the type of protection the people felt they needed or who personified the characteristics they honored and revered. Most of the temples were looked after by the village people. Priests were in attendance only for special services. These priests had had, of course, the official Buddhist or Taoist training.

It must also be remembered that generally most of the Chinese do not feel the exclusiveness about their religion that often is felt by those trained in the traditions of Western countries. They can believe in both Buddhist and Taoist teachings and can worship in any of the temples if the deities have the attributes they desire to worship or are able to give the sort of help they need. One writer says that this is due to the fact that a popular religion has developed that has borrowed from Buddhism, Taoism, and the Official cult but is distinct from them and must be regarded as a separate system.

If the 855 village temples are grouped according to the connection of the principal deity, there were 345 Taoist, 223 Official, 215 Buddhist, 54 belonging to individual cults, and 18 that must be classed as miscellaneous as they were dedicated to all the gods or else their name, such as Big Temple, did not indicate their connection. The percentage division was 41 per cent Taoist, 26 per cent Official, 25 per cent Buddhist, 6 per cent Individual, and 2 per cent miscellaneous. In the Experimental District the division was very similar—45 per cent Taoist, 24 per cent Official, 23 per cent Buddhist, and 8 per cent Individual.

The principal Taoist deities, judging from the number of temples dedicated to them, were the Wu Tao, gods of the five elements, with 157 temples; the San Kuan, the three rulers of heaven, earth, and water; the Niang Niangs, a group of female deities who grant children, protect the eyes, etc.; Chen Wu, who alone among men is perfection itself; Yü Huang, the Jade or Pearly Emperor, the supreme god of the Taoist pantheon. Forty-five per cent of the Taoist temples were Wu Tao Miao; 91 per cent were dedicated to the above five groups of deities.

Kuan Yü, the Chinese god of war and also one of the gods of literature, was by far the most popular of the Official gods. He was the chief or one of the chief gods in 148, two-thirds, of the Official Temples. The dragons had 45 temples dedicated to them in Ting Hsien. These two groups included 86 per cent of the Official temples.

In 91 per cent of the Buddhist temples the chief deity was one of the

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782 selves were driven south of Ting Hsien. There was looting when the Fengtien forces left Ting Hsien, and more when they returned and recaptured the area after fighting inside the city walls. This is said to be one of the worst times in Ting Hsien in recent years. After they had one experience with the looting of the Fengtien troops, it is not to be wondered at that the people turned to their gods for protection against a repetition of that experience. The year 1928 was not included in the period of our study of special religious expenditure, so we have no report concerning special services that may have been held because of the fighting and looting of that year.

Three villages spent $440 praying for protection from sickness, an average of $147 per village. One village reported spending $600 during five years for services seeking protection from hail. This total probably included a large amount spent for some special item such as the renovation of the temple. Perhaps an annual service was held in anticipation of possible damage. Hail damaged the crops in both 1923 and 1926.

There was damage from floods every year from 1922 to 1926, but only one village in the Experimental District reported holding special services to ask for divine protection from that sort of damage. The expenditure was only $70, so probably only one, or not more than two, services were held during the five years.

The largest average expenditure was made in connection with reappearances of the gods. Three villages reported a total expenditure of $1,150, or an average of $385 per village, for such services. This amount probably included some expenditure for the renovation of the temples as well as the cost of the celebration services.

During the 12 years from 1915 to 1926, the record of calamities shows seven years with flood, three with drought, five with hail, seven with locusts, three with sickness, cholera or plague, one with frost, and three with looting.

511 The families in our budget study (see Chapter V) spent an average of 75 cents when they went to the temple fair, but most of that was for entertainment rather than for any religious items. Their expenditure for religion averaged 70 cents for the year, most of it for paper money and incense.

346 178 771 871 One wishes the records were available to show what special events or particular influences were connected with the erection of the various temples and what were the special periods of temple building and re-

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building. We know that the history of some temples goes back to Ming, Yuan, and even Sung times, but, for the present at least, the other questions cannot be answered for Ting Hsien. In order to determine how much of a change there had been in recent years, the village elders of the Experimental District were asked what temples they had in their villages, what temples they used to have, and when any discontinued temples had been given up. The comparison of the two lists showed a tremendous decrease. The fifty years from 1882 to 1932 were a period of temple destruction rather than of temple building or rebuilding. Increasing contacts with the outside world, modern education, and many other influences had apparently weakened the hold of the gods on the people, and through the years a large proportion of the temples had been given up, converted to other uses, sold, or torn down.

Before 1882 there were 435 temples in the 62 villages of the Experimental District, but in 1928 the number was only 104. Three hundred and thirty-one temples, 76 per cent of the original list, had been given up. Before 1899 only two temples were reported as being discontinued, one in 1882 and one in 1889. From 1899 through 1917 there were only two years when at least one temple was not given up. Those years were 1901 and 1903. Between 1917 and 1928 only two were discontinued, one in 1926 and one in 1928. Eighty-two per cent of the discontinued temples were given up during three years 1900, 1914, and 1915. Twenty-seven were destroyed in 1900, Boxer year, largely as a result of the foreign troops coming to Ting Hsien after the capture of Peking. Two hundred were discontinued in 1914 and another 45 were given up in 1915. The influence of the Revolution and of the magistrate Sun Fa Hsü seems to have been responsible for this big decrease. Taking office in May, 1914, Sun came to Ting Hsien with the idea of getting rid of many of the old customs and promoting modern education throughout the entire hsien. He put pressure on the village elders to get them to give up the temples and to open schools. This program was opposed by many of the villages. In one part of the hsien some 10,000 people joined the Catholic church hoping that thereby they might avoid the additional taxes that would be necessary to provide for the school budget. In this they were unsuccessful. Magistrate Sun was in office less than two and a half years, but during that time 68 per cent of the existing temples were discontinued. Forty-eight per cent of the schools of the Experi-

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mental District were opened during the five years from 1912 to 1916, practically all of them during the last two years of that period.

As money was not readily available for the erection of any considerable number of school buildings, the elders of not a few villages were willing to accept the suggestion of the magistrate that they turn some of the available and relatively little used temples into school rooms. Most of them had been built by popular subscription, so it was not difficult to turn them over to other uses if the village elders could be persuaded that the new uses were a public benefit. It is rather surprising, however, to find that even as early as 1914 the old beliefs had been so undermined that the people were able to see so many temples given up without too much fear of the wrath of the gods.

The rent of land that had been given to some of the temples was, in several cases at least, transferred from the temple to the village school as the popularity of the temple waned and the village was required to expand its educational program.

If the change in the number of temples in the Experimental District can be taken as typical of the entire hsien, there used to be some 3,575 temples in the 453 villages and some 2,000 of these were given up during 1914 and 1915 while Sun Fa-hsü was in office. This seems to be an almost impossible number, but there does not seem to be any reason why a larger proportion should be given up in the Experimental District than in the rest of the hsien. Even if the temples discontinued during those years were only one-half the estimated number, it still would show that new ideas brought in by the Revolution of 1911 and by Magistrate Sun had a tremendous influence on the external expression of the religious life of the hsien. As only two temples were given up between 1917 and 1928, the wave of anti-religious feeling that started as anti-Christian about 1921, but gradually became anti-all-religion as it reached its height in 1927–1928, seems to have had but little influence on the religious life of Ting Hsien. The movement centered in South and Central China and in the cities and, as far as we can see, did not greatly affect the rural areas of North China.

The 1882 list of temples in the Experimental District shows that all but one of the villages had one or more temples. The single exception was a village in which, in 1928, 72 per cent of the families were Mohammedans. Thirty-six per cent of the villages had from one to five temples, 48 per cent from six to 10, and 15 per cent had more than 10

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temples. Only one village had more than 17. For it the number was 22. The average was seven temples per village.

On the 1928 list 50 per cent of the Experimental District villages had no temples and only 6.4 per cent instead of 63 per cent had more than five temples. The maximum was 11. The average for all the villages was 1.7 or 3.4 for the villages that had temples.

While 30 villages had given up all their temples, seven still had the same number. One wishes it were possible to determine what were the differences in belief, experience, and contact with new ideas that led one village with 22 temples and another with 17 to give up all of them and one with 17 and another with 15 temples to discontinue all but one each while one village with 12 temples kept all but one and one village with seven temples and another with eight gave up none.

If we assume that the number of families in each village remained constant from 1882 to 1928, one village had, in 1882, one temple for every four families and there were six villages where there were less than 10 families per temple. In two of these six villages the number was still under 10 in 1928. In 1882 40 per cent of the villages had less than 20 families and 92 per cent had less than 50 families per temple. The maximum was 90, the average 24. In 1928 only 8 per cent of the villages had less than 20 families per temple. In only 13 per cent, instead of 92 per cent, was the number less than 50 families per temple. In six villages it was over 100 and in two it was over 345. The maximum was 362. One-half the villages had no temples. For the 62 villages the average number of families per temple was 100 or 10 more than the earlier maximum. For the entire hsien the 1930 average was 78 families per temple.

The village elders reported the 1928 use of 135, 41 per cent, of the discontinued temples. Fifty-seven were used for school buildings; another 25 were being used for other public purposes, such as village offices and public storehouses; 47 had been sold to private owners and probably had been torn down for the material in them; two were being rented out, the rent going to the public funds of the village; three had been torn down and the land added to the village public land; one had been turned over to some monks and was used by them as their residence.

More than a proportionate number of the larger temples were given up, possibly because they would provide better school accommodations,

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perhaps because of the cost involved in repairing them if they had fallen into disrepair. In 1928 83 per cent of the Experimental District temples had only one chien and only 3 per cent had more than three chien. In the 1882 list the corresponding figures were 70 per cent and 9 per cent. According to the earlier list the average number of temple chien per village was 15. In 1928 it was 2.8.

In 396 temples of the earlier list the gods were represented by images, in 31 by pictures painted on the walls. There were 2,157 images in the 396 temples, an average for the temples with images of 5.4. One-half of the temples had three images and another 14 per cent had only one image. Forty-eight temples, 12 per cent, had 10 or more images. The maximum was 116. Of these 48 larger temples, only six were maintained in 1928.

In 1928 there were 78 temples with images and 26 with pictures. The number of images was 404 or an average of 5.2. This was only slightly lower than the 1882 average. There was not more difference because one temple with 116 images was included in both lists. If that temple is omitted, the 1928 average was 3.7 images per temple. One would naturally expect a low average as 83 per cent of the temples on the 1928 list had only one chien and on a single altar there is hardly room for more than one large image or three smaller ones.

A comparison of the 1928 and 1882 lists shows that while 76 per cent of all the temples had been given up, 85 per cent of those with five or more images had been discontinued, 91 per cent of those with 15 or more, and 94 per cent of those with 20 or more images.

Because there are some 18 different names of Buddhist temples on the earlier list, but only five on the 1928 list, our first impression was that the non-Buddhist gods had the stronger hold on the people and that a larger proportion of the Buddhist temples had been given up than was true of the other groups. Further analysis of the figures showed that the opposite was true. The Taoist, Official, and Individual groups lost from 75 to 78 per cent of their temples but only 70 per cent of the Buddhist temples were discontinued. The difference is not large, but it would seem to suggest that the Buddhist gods or more especially Kuan Yin, to whom in her various manifestations some 91 per cent of the Buddhist temples are dedicated, had a stronger hold on the hearts of the people than most of the other gods.

Two-thirds of the temples dedicated to Kuan Yin had been given up

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but of the more popular deities, those with four or more temples, she was the only one that, in 1928, had more than 30 per cent of the number in 1882. Yü Huang, the Pearly Emperor, had only one left out of 22, a 95 per cent loss. The decrease in the temples dedicated to the other female deities was 77 per cent or just about the average loss. For all of the goddesses together, the decrease was 70 per cent. Their temples were 21 per cent of the earlier list but were 27 per cent of the 1928 list.

Some new temples were built after 1928 and others were renovated. We have not attempted a study of the reasons for this activity, but it seems to indicate that some of the people were turning again to the old gods. Considering the events of the years immediately following 1925, this is hardly surprising. Chinese armies marched through and occupied the district. There was fighting, bombing from airplanes, looting, heavier taxes, and extraordinary demands for money, supplies, and men. Unable to get help and protection from the forces of this world, it is not surprising that some of the people came to feel that their only hope was in the forces of the spirit world and that their help should be sought through special services, the rebuilding of temples fallen into disrepair, and the erection of new shrines.

Soon after the uniting of the country in 1928 the Nationalist government issued a decree concerning the temples. Those dedicated to the sages and worthies of preceding ages were to be kept up. This list included the three mythical emperors, Fu Hsi, Shen Nung, Huang Ti, Lei Ts'u (who first reared silk worms), Ts'ang Chieh (the inventor of writing), Hou Chi (the Harvest Patron), Emperor Yü, Confucius, Mencius, Kung Shu Pan, Kuan Yü, and Yueh Fei. The temples and churches of the religious sect teaching theism with a pure and right intention were to be continued. These included the followers of Sakyamuni and Lao Tzu, Mohammedanism and Christianity.

The temples to be suppressed were those in which purely legendary personages were worshiped with no practical utility. These included the temples of the stellar spirits, the sun, the moo: , etc., of Huo Shen the fire god, of K'uei Hsing the god of literature, of Wen Ch'ang (the cult of the battleflag), of the genii of the mountains, rivers, and earth, of the five holy peaks, the four rivers, the river spirits, the Dragon Kings, the Ministry of Thunder, of T'ai Shan, Tung Yueh, Ch'eng Huang, and T'u Ti; also the temples offending against public morality by playing on the credulity of people for gain, the temples of Chang

2:Gamble S-5 (1926-1933) 1954 AF12 North China AF12

Hsien, Sung Tzu, Niang Niang, Ts'ai Shen, Erh Lang, Sun Hou Tzu the monkey god, Wen Shen, Hsüan T'an the god of riches, Shih Ch'ien, and Hu Hsien the fox spirit.

The decree marked for suppression a large part of the Ting Hsien temples, but, up to 1935, there seems to have been no serious effort to enforce it in North China. It seemed then that, lacking governmental pressure, the number of temples would probably diminish very gradually, that as the less popular temples fell into disrepair they would be given up, but that the belief in the more popular deities was so widespread and so deeply imbedded in the life of the people that it would continue for a long time. What influence the war with Japan and the Japanese occupation had on the religious life of Ting Hsien is unknown.

Freedom of religion is part of the constitution of the new Central People's Government, but it is reported that when the Communists were in control of parts of Kiangsi province they destroyed all the temples and shrines in the area. How many temples will survive in Ting Hsien?

Temple Fairs

Fairs held to honor the gods and to present them with incense, feasts, and entertainment combined religious worship, amusement, recreation, business, and sociability. They were the largest public activities associated with any of the temples. Thousands of people came from neighboring villages and even farther afield and there was great activity during the three, four, or more days of the fair. Free theatrical performances were regularly part of the program and were very popular.

Many of the fairs have a long history but we also found that new ones were being organized at the time of our study.

While the fairs usually were held to honor one of the more popular gods and worship was regularly part of the program, in at least one town there were two annual fairs that had no religious connection.

Not every temple or every village or even every market village had a fair. The city, two of its three suburbs, and 35 of the 453 towns and villages held fairs. How they were distributed throughout the hsien is shown on the hsien map on page 5. The map also shows the month when the fairs were held. Fifty was the total number reported. Six fairs were listed in the city, four in one town, three in another, and two in

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CHAPTER X.

RELIGION.

1. Religious Distribution.

•771 Religion in China is in most cases a family affair forced upon the members by the family head; so that usually the whole family is reported as holding the same faith, and naturally under such circumstances we find very little interest in religion especially among those who call themselves Buddhists. The following table shows the number of people and the religions which they profess:

TABLE LX. RELIGIOUS DISTRIBUTION BY FAMILIES.

RELIGION	NO. OF FAMILIES	%
Buddhists	323	87.1
Mohammedans.	42	11.3
Christians.	3	.8
Confucianists.	1	.3
No relicious affiliation.	2	.5
Total	371	100.0

According to these figures the Buddhist faith claims the largest number of adherents, but usually

those people who have no religious affiliation call themselves Buddhists, even although they know nothing of Buddhist principles, and do not observe the Buddhist ceremonies except in the case of a death. The term Confucianist is also vague, as people will often know a great deal about Confucianist principles and observe many of the ceremonies and yet not report themselves as Confucianists because they do not consider Confucianism as a system of religion. In fact in most cases they are neither Buddhist nor Confucianist, but atheists, believing a little of everything, but not understanding any form seriously enough to be called believers.

If we take the individual as the religious unit we shall have to deduct the young people who have not the freedom to choose or reject their religious affiliation, and we have taken 16 years as the dividing line, although it is of course arbitrary and artificial, but it will serve our present purpose:

TABLE LXI. RELIGIOUS DISTRIBUTION BY INDIVIDUALS.

RELIGION.	TOTAL		MALE		FEMALE	
	No.	°/₀	No.	°/₀	No.	°/₀
Buddhists	1774	89.1	1130	90.7	644	86.3
Mohammedans	200	10.1	108	8.7	92	12.7
Christians	11	.6	4	.3	7	.9
Confucianists.	3	.2	2	.2	1	.1
No religious offiliation.	2	.1	1	.1	1	.1
Total	1990	100.0	1245	100.0	745	100.0

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771 Here the so-called Buddhists still hold the first place, with a percentage almost the same as that in calculating the distribntion by families. The table does not tell us much, except as it points to the significance of the Mohammedans who form 10% of the whole population over 16 years, and therefore, play a big part in the life of the town.

2. The Mohammedan Temple.

779 The religious life of the Mohammedans is centred in the Mohammedan Temple situated on the north side of the river. Originally it was on the south side, but in 1899 the Mohammedans contributed towards the new building on the present site.

779 793 Two officers are in charge of the Temple, the ahung or pastor, and the butcher. The ahung is selected every third year, and is eligible for re-election. He is the leader of all religious ceremonies both inside the Temple or in the families, and teaches the children the Turkish language and the Mohammedan bible. The butcher holds a permanent position, and is a person proficient in the killing of of livestock, who takes charge of all the killing for the members. In addition to these two regular officers there are three elders and a number of assistants who are all voluntary workers. The elders deal with finance matters and other important business, and the assistants help the elders in the administrative side of the work. The voluntary workers are elected from among the members, and their term of office is indefinite, depending upon the ability and aptitude of the individual. The elders are responsible for